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ABSTRACT 
Faith is a dynamic concept that has been understood both according to 
its content (as beliefs) and in terms of the relationship that evokes it. In 
this article faith is considered as event, and the work of three 
contemporary French thinkers (Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy, and 
Jean-Luc Marion) is used to elucidate what thinking faith in this way might 
mean for Christian theology. 
 
*     *     *     *     * 
 
In Christian theology, faith is understood to have two dimensions: it can be 
understood as a set of beliefs (fides quae), or as that by which we believe 
(fides qua). Of interest to me here is how we understand the latter—what we 
might call the faith event—since it grounds the very possibility of belief. Here I 
propose to examine briefly contributions that might be made to a theology of 
faith from three significant contemporary thinkers: Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc 
Nancy, and Jean-Luc Marion. In drawing from their works I do not presume to 
make them speak on behalf of Christian faith, except where they might 
choose to, but aim to sketch ways of approaching faith that try to take 
seriously faith’s nescience and its radical character as act. It seems to me that 
being able to engage with thought such as this, which is undertaken always 
with an eye to the limits of metaphysics, is rightly part of the challenge of 
theology today. 
Jacques Derrida: faith without object 
We turn first to Derrida, that apparently atheistic man of faith, although in 
recalling his often-quoted phrase, “I quite rightly pass for an atheist,” we must 
be careful not to assume too quickly that we know what he means.1 
Reflections on faith occur in many contexts in Derrida’s work, but he often 
considers faith in the context of reason, and in terms of the Kantian opposition 
between faith and knowledge. In broad terms, for Derrida, faith is the 
condition of relation: “that is why,” he says, “I constantly refer to the 
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experience of faith as simply a speech act, as simply the social 
experience….”2 Faith is the condition of possibility for any reason at all, but 
since faith is also reason’s condition of impossibility (reason cannot be purely 
reasonable), it is a quasi-transcendental.3 In this sense, faith is fundamentally 
trust in the other, without reason or ground.4 
 
Fundamental to Derrida’s account of faith is that it is not knowledge: “ … faith, 
in the moment proper to it, is blind. It sacrifices sight even if it does so with an 
eye to seeing at last.”5 In his extended meditation on blindness, Derrida notes 
particularly that those who witness to religious faith in a moment of conversion 
are often struck blind, most dramatically in the case of Paul (as we read in 
Acts, “though his eyes were open, he could see nothing” [9:8]).6 One of 
Derrida’s most faithful commentators, John D. Caputo, provides the following 
gloss: 
 … the eyes of faith are, as such, blind; to see with the eyes of faith 
is to take on faith precisely what we do not see. That is why the 
‘witness’ for Derrida can never be an eye witness but precisely the 
opposite, someone ‘abocular’ who gives witness or bears witness in 
his or her life to what they believe but do not see. The witness is not 
empowered by truth—sciential or savoir, intuitus or voir— … but, 
following Augustine, the witness does the truth or makes the truth … 
in her life. Faith is structurally inhabited by blindness, which is its 
quasi-transcendental condition.7  
For Derrida, faith can only be faith if it does not see. It involves the 
suspension of knowledge (that is, it can have no determined object).8 When 
being asked about prayer, Derrida says: “I could talk of epochē, meaning by 
that the suspension of certainty, not of belief. This suspension of certainty is 
part of prayer. I consider that this suspension of certainty, this suspension of 
knowledge, is part of an answer to the question ‘Who do you expect to answer 
these prayers?’”9 Later in the same interview he uses the terms slightly 
differently: “It is in the epochē, in the suspension of belief, the suspension of 
the position of God as a thesis, that faith appears.”10  
 
In Derrida’s work, faith touches on the secret. Now, while Derrida’s secret is 
that there is no secret (there is nothing outside the text), and that the secret 
“is without content, without a content separable from its performative 
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experience, from its performative tracing,” the secret does not preclude 
meaning, but pushes us to find meaning while never allowing us to remain 
settled in it (in Caputo’s terms, “faith is the passion of unknowing”).11 This is 
why theological faith (where it is determinate and fixed) is such a potential 
difficulty for Derrida, although he does not exclude its possibility in what he 
calls “a unique experience.” Hence, “ … the experience of faith [and 
presumably here he means just such a unique experience] is something that 
exceeds language in a certain way…. In relation to this experience of faith, 
deconstruction is totally, totally useless and disarmed. … Perhaps it is 
because deconstruction starts from the possibility of … a secret, an absolutely 
secret experience which I would compare with what you call grace.”12  
 
While Derrida’s understanding of faith in its utter blindness can be interpreted 
as nihilistic, I do not think this needs to be so (and it has even been argued 
that such a kenotic understanding of faith is “the most rigorously Christlike”).13 
To say that the experience of faith yields no positive content does not mean 
that one cannot say “I have faith in God,” but only that in saying this one 
confesses—beyond all the usual theological caveats—not to know whether 
one is, in Derrida’s own words, “referring to someone or mentioning a 
name.”14 In this context, he goes on to add that to name is to call, and that to 
call is not to be sure of the response, whether one calls to another person or 
calls to God.15 Like justice, love, the gift, hospitality, and a number of other 
themes examined in Derrida’s writing, God might be recognised in faith as 
“the impossible to come,” while we admit the structural limits within thought 
around the in-breaking of this impossibility.16 Faith resists knowledge; its 
object cannot be known as such, but this does not mean that it cannot be 
decided or risked.17  
Jean-Luc Nancy: faith as a relation to the nothing 
To use the work of Nancy in the context of a reflection on Christian faith may 
at first appear quite meaningless. We cannot simply describe his thought as 
atheistic, yet seeking to go beyond what he sees as the false opposition 
between theism and atheism, Nancy affirms a kind of atheology in the sense 
articulated by Georges Bataille.18 Further, in spite of the fact that much of his 
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recent material seems to dwell somehow within Christianity, he is insistent 
that in his work it is not a question of any return to religion.19 We might say 
that his thought is a kind of “absentheism”: “beyond all positing of an object of 
belief or disbelief.”20 Without wishing to re-baptise Nancy, I have two reasons 
to make a preliminary examination of his work on faith: his thinking of the 
moment of faith as event, and his absolute insistence that the act of faith has 
nothing to do with beliefs.  
 
Nancy is concerned with the drive to discover the basic principle or principles 
that give reason to the world.21 “The signal weakness of any logic of the 
premise,” Nancy observes, “ … shows itself at the crucial point where theism 
and atheism prove to belong to each other…. The decisive point is this—it 
ought to be the task of the principle, as we have sketched it above, to exceed 
qua principle principiation itself.”22 In this context, faith is not knowledge of the 
principle (or premise), although this might be its function in religion. Instead, 
Nancy maintains: 
Faith is not weak, hypothetical, or subjective knowledge. It is neither 
unverifiable nor received through submission, nor even through 
reason. It is not a belief in the ordinary sense of the term. On the 
contrary, it is the act of the reason that relates, itself, to that which, in 
it, passes it infinitely: faith stands precisely at the point of an 
altogether consequent atheism. This is to say that it stands at the 
point where atheism is dispossessed of belief in the premise or 
principle and in principate, in general. … Reason does not suffice 
unto itself: for itself it is not a sufficient reason.23 
Faith opens reason to its own beyond. This is reminiscent of Kant’s practical 
reason, in many ways, but stripped of its teleology.24 Yet we may still be 
enabled to speak of “God,” albeit in an atheological mode.25 Nancy 
comments: 
What the name ‘God’ or that of the ‘holy’ rigorously attempts to 
designate in this atheological regime … refers not only to a ruining of 
the premise but … to ‘something,’ to ‘someone,’ or to ‘a nothing’ … 
of which faith is itself the birthplace or the creative event. That ‘God’ 
himself may be the fruit of faith, which at the same time depends 
only on his grace … is a thought profoundly foreign to the 
theism/atheism pair. It is the thinking of alterity opened by and 
exposed outside of sameness, as that which exceeds thinking 
infinitely without in any way being principial to it. Yet this thinking is 
not foreign to Christian reflection….26 
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He goes on to cite as an example the words of Makarios of Magnesia about 
giving birth to Christ through faith, but we could equally be reminded of the 
expressions of Meister Eckhart.27 Having said this, Nancy still questions 
whether “God” is an appropriate name for “this alterity of reason.” Yet naming 
becomes important once again in his extended meditation on the epistle of 
James, where faith “draws its consistency from somewhere else: from a 
proper name” (in this case, the name of Jesus). Nancy underscores that here 
the crucial thing is that “the proper name does not turn into a concept.”28  
 
What strikes me about Nancy’s thinking of faith as “the act of the reason that 
relates, itself, to that which, in it, passes it infinitely,” is its character as event. 
Coming from nowhere, and giving no-thing as such, we have here a thinking 
of the moment of thought’s destitution. The extreme astringency of this 
moment is almost unbearable, but it is also potentially very exciting, and, 
approached in a particular way, not antithetical to Christian thought. This is 
apparent in Nancy’s consideration of faith versus beliefs. 
 
In the context of a discussion of divine kenosis, Nancy argues that the God of 
Christianity is not a God hidden in withdrawal, but instead completely 
“emptied out,” and therefore without signification.29 “Christian assurance,” he 
maintains, “can take place only at the cost of a category completely opposed 
to that of religious beliefs: the category of ‘faith,’ which is faithfulness to an 
absence and a certainty of this faithfulness in the absence of all assurance. In 
this sense, the atheist who firmly refuses all consoling or redemptive 
assurance is paradoxically or strangely closer to faith than the ‘believer.’” This 
is not faithfulness to an absent God (that is, to a God present elsewhere) but 
faithfulness in the face of God-in-absence.30 Now, while we have to keep in 
mind Nancy’s atheological perspective, such an “experience”—if we are able 
to call it such—is nevertheless again suggestive of what is described by some 
of the Christian mystics.31 
 
A second example occurs in the context of the discussion of James. Nancy 
insists that faith is understood here to be an act, and not “adherence to a 
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message.”32 Faith is praxis, or “the praxical excess of and in action or in 
operation….”33 So, we read:  
In that sense, this faith can no more be a property of the subject 
than it can be the subject’s ‘work’: this faith must be asked for and 
received—which does not prevent it from being asked for with 
faith…. (… [T]here is at the heart of faith a decision of faith that 
precedes itself and exceeds itself.) In this sense, faith cannot be an 
adherence to some contents of belief. If belief must be understood 
as a weak form or an analogy of knowledge, then faith is not of the 
order of belief. It comes neither from a knowledge nor from a 
wisdom, not even by analogy.34  
Comparing James with Paul in their various understandings of the figure of 
Abraham, Nancy maintains that James’ Abraham is great because he does, 
not because he believes.35 However, to the extent that faith does implicate the 
understanding, Nancy declares: 
 … this faith resides in the inadequation of one’s own ‘logos’ to itself. 
The reasons that this faith has ‘to believe’ are not reasons. Thus it 
has nothing, in sum, with which to convince itself. This faith is but 
the ‘conviction’ that gives itself over in act—not even to something 
‘incomprehensible’ (according to a logic of the ‘I cannot understand 
but I must or I may still believe,’ and still less according to a logic of 
the credo quia absurdum) but to that which is another act: a 
commandment. Faith is not argumentative; it is the performative of 
the commandment—or it is homogenous with it. Faith resides in 
inadequation to itself as a content of meaning. [Faith is] the contrary 
of a truth believed. This faith, above all, does not believe. …… It is a 
non-belief whose faith guarantees it as non-believable.”36 
Faith comes from the other, or from the outside: extrapolating from the idea of 
faith as “the performative of the commandment,” and drawing from the work of 
Jean-Louis Chrétien and Marion, we might say that it is given as the 
response.37 This leads us to raise, if only in a preliminary way, the question of 
faith as gift. Nancy makes reference to this a number of times, but the most 
striking example is where he discusses the way in which the act of faith 
exceeds itself, noting that “in this, faith would be the very act of a homoiōsis 
with the gift itself, understood in the sense of its act. Homoiōsis as heteroiōsis, 
the identity of the concept … qua the incommensurability of the conceiving in 
act.”38 While he does not explicitly refer to Derrida’s analysis of the gift, this 
essay is actually an address to Derrida, and we could argue that it is to 
Derrida’s gift that he refers here.39 That would mean that in the same way that 
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the gift is aporetic, so also faith: it is instantiated as the impossible. The gift (“if 
there is one”) would not be known as such. 
 
While we have dwelled on Nancy’s thought perhaps longer that we ought to 
have, it is important at least to mention some of the other ways in which he 
speaks about faith. One of these is the possibility that faith is a saturated 
phenomenon. As we will see in our discussion of Marion, a saturated 
phenomenon gives itself in an excess of intuition, for which intentional 
concepts are inadequate. Nancy suggests that faith is “the adhesion to itself 
of an aim without other,” or without object.40 He writes: “one could perhaps 
say that faith is pure intentionality, or that it is the phenomenon of 
intentionality as a self-sufficient phenomenon, as a ‘saturated phenomenon,’ 
in Jean-Luc Marion’s sense.”41 Nancy also speaks of faith as “exposure,” or 
allowing oneself “to be exposed to the absence of parousia….”42 He then 
addresses the question of the relation between the fides qua and the fides 
quae, as faith in the word of God.43 Maintaining that this relation is played out 
in two ways, he suggests either that the act is dominant, in which case “ … 
the sense of faith is so intimate, so private, that it is inaccessible to the 
subject,” or that the spoken word received by the community (that is, the 
content of faith as beliefs) is dominant, but that it is dissolved or dissipated in 
the division of the community (the beliefs never actually harden into a single 
interpretation).44 According to either means, he argues that “faith always 
comes down to the infinity of sense…,” and that it ultimately becomes 
“faithfulness to faithfulness itself.”45 Finally, some mention needs to be made 
of Nancy’s comments on prayer, since they relate so closely to what Derrida 
has said. In an essay concerning the work of Michel Deguy, Nancy speaks of 
“praying without prayer.”46 For Nancy, prayer has no object, but is instead “the 
very act of transcending,” the act of remaining faithful without the assurance 
of belief.47 
Jean-Luc Marion: faith in the n/Name48 
We turn now to the work of Marion, which offers us the least explicit 
commentary on faith but is situated within a context of Christian 
commitment.49 Marion’s work is actually more oriented to the flip side of faith, 
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which is the question of revelation, but this, together with his thought of 
experience, as well as occasional remarks on faith and belief, enables us to 
draw some conclusions about his understanding. 
 
For Marion, phenomenology allows us to think the possibility of phenomena of 
revelation by way of the saturated phenomenon, that is, where the givenness 
of the phenomenon overruns the available concepts that might enable us to 
see it as any thing.50 There is thus an inevitable (if ambiguous) role for 
hermeneutics in Marion’s phenomenology. What is given in revelation is 
Revelation only because what is given excessively (and thus beyond 
determination) is interpreted as such. This highlights the relationship between 
revelation and faith.51  
 
From the perspective of experience, the saturated phenomenon can be 
understood as counter-experience; by way of it we “experience … the 
counter-experience itself.”52 This is not the experience of any thing, but is “a 
contrary experience or rather one that always counteracts”; “it is confined to 
counteracting the counteracting of intuition by the concept.”53 There are three 
characteristics of counter-experience: there is no longer any concept at which 
intentionality can aim; all concepts are saturated by intuition; and it unsettles, 
perturbs, or agitates the witness whom it afflicts.54 The counter-experience 
affects me, and has the potential to change me.55  
 
So, what might be given in a counter-experience of God? Marion writes that 
the givenness of God (which he describes as an “absolute mode of 
presence”) 
cannot present itself as an object, which is necessarily limited. 
Consequently, it occupies no space, fixes no attention, draws no 
look. In his very bedazzlement, ‘God’ shines by his absence. 
Evidence evoids—it voids the saturated horizons of any definable 
visible thing. The absence or unknowability of ‘God’ does not 
contradict his givenness but on the contrary attests to the excellence 
of that givenness.56 
How would we “know” God in this “experience” of dazzling excess? We 
“know” God only in the pragmatics of naming God, of addressing ourselves to 
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God. In the context of a more recent discussion, concerning mystical 
theology, Marion maintains: 
In the case of God, knowledge becomes an unknowing, or rather until it 
becomes one that is capable of acknowledging the incomprehensible, 
and thereby respects the operative, pragmatic, and endlessly 
repeatable de-nomination of God…. 
 
De-nomination … does not end up in a ‘metaphysics of presence’…. 
Rather, it ends up as a pragmatic theology of absence—where the 
name is given as having no name, as not giving the essence, and 
having nothing but this absence to make manifest….57 
Strikingly, despite the enormous gulf between Marion and Nancy, their 
descriptions at this point bear a remarkable similarity.  
 
It is in light of these aspects of Marion’s thought that we turn to consider his 
descriptions of faith. As Shane Mackinlay demonstrates (and here I am 
indebted to his analysis), Marion’s most extended discussion of faith is also, 
unfortunately, the most problematic.58 Marion begins his discussion of the 
Emmaus story with a sketch of what faith is not, that is, a way “to compensate 
faulty intuition….” On this account, “I believe because … I want to hold as true 
that which does not offer intuitive data sufficient to impose itself by itself.”59 
Marion holds this view to be blasphemous, not least because it places the 
believer in the position of having to decide “on the existence of God and the 
truth of Christ.”60 Instead of faith concerning a deficit in intuition, Marion 
prefers to think it as involving a deficit in concepts adequate to the 
superabundantly given intuition (of revelation). In his discussion of Emmaus, 
the disciples move from receiving excessive intuition without recognising it, 
owing to their lack of adequate concepts, to matching that intuition with 
appropriate concepts in the moment of Christ’s breaking of the bread. Marion 
argues: 
Faith does not compensate … for a defect of visibility: on the 
contrary, it allows reception of the intelligence of the phenomenon 
and the strength to bear the glare of its brilliance. Faith does not 
manage the deficit of evidence—it alone renders the gaze apt to see 
the excess of the pre-eminent saturated phenomenon, the 
Revelation.61 
Mackinlay maintains that Marion’s understanding of faith here is inadequate 
on three basic counts. First, Marion misreads the story: “The disciple’s lack of 
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faith is not simply a lack of concepts to understand the excess of Jesus’ 
revelation, but also a lack of openness to his revelation as such, which 
prevents them from seeing it either as revelatory or excessive.”62 In the story, 
the disciples actually move from seeing Christ as quite ordinary to having an 
excessive intuition of him only in his breaking of bread and disappearance.63 
Second, Marion goes against the Gospel sense of faith, which Mackinlay 
argues is “first of all … existential and hermeneutic,” rather than conceptual.64 
Finally, Marion goes against his own methodology, since his argument results 
in the saturated phenomenon of Christ becoming quite ordinary once its 
saturation is neutralised by concepts in the disciples moment of insight.65 
 
Through an analysis of other texts, Mackinlay goes on to argue that the 
understanding of faith expressed in the Emmaus piece is actually an 
aberration in Marion’s thought, which tends towards faith as an existential. 
Elsewhere the evidential aspect is not what is crucial for faith. For example, 
Marion writes: “faith neither compensates for the lack of evidence nor resolves 
itself in arguments, but decides by the will for or against the love of Love.”66 In 
other texts, although not always explicitly, faith seems to be a condition for 
revelation to occur.67 And in Marion’s discussion of mystical theology, 
Mackinlay observes “ … what Marion describes as the way in which apophatic 
theology’s pragmatic commitment of faith opens a hermeneutic space in 
which the phenomenon of revelation can appear.”68 Mackinlay’s view is 
reinforced by a comment Marion makes in an interview, where belief (and 
here I suggest he means faith) is a commitment to someone that “open[s] a 
field of experience.”69 He continues: “And so it’s not only a substitute for not 
knowing, it is an act which makes a new kind of experience possible. It is 
because I believe that I will see, and not as a compensation. It’s the very fact 
that you believe which makes you see new things, which would not be seen if 
you did not believe.”70 
 
Thus recognising that Marion holds an orthodox view of faith as opening a 
space for belief, for our purposes we also need to focus more precisely on the 
faith event as he might understand it. For Marion, faith is the knowledge 
arrived at by way of love, a love that wills to believe.71 “Nothing separates, 
On Faith: Relation to an Infinite Passing  
 
11
perhaps, he who believes from he who does not believe, except this: not 
reasons, of course, not some certainty…, but merely believing despite the 
belief that one does not believe.”72 Significantly, this act of assent is without 
ground: “nothing separates the believer from the unbeliever, except faith, 
which plays out over nothing: nothing, which is here a way to say the 
oscillation of the will in front of Love.”73 Considering the context of the 
“pragmatic theology of absence” cited earlier, no-thing is precisely what is at 
issue. In faith we name what we do not know, in response to a call that is only 
made manifest precisely in that response.74 
Some theological implications 
Three contemporary thinkers, three men of faith: I have tried to sketch here, in 
a very introductory way, what faith might mean in a context where 
metaphysics is perpetually in its death throes. To conclude, I will endeavour to 
draw out some implications of this sketch for theology. 
 
In drawing from thinkers whose work tends to exclude “God” in the sense 
traditionally used by theology and/or as this assumes the presuppositions of 
metaphysics, the jury has to remain out on the question of whether when we 
use the word “God” we are “referring to someone or mentioning a name.” 
Even Marion, who appeases his audience in the preface to the English edition 
of Dieu sans l'être by affirming “God is, exists, and that is the least of 
things,”75 cannot ultimately take us any further than the n/Name. While he 
would agree that this is so phenomenologically, I would also suggest that it is 
true theologically (although this requires a more substantial argument than I 
can present here). Even Marion recognises that the ground of beliefs is itself 
“groundless,” since beliefs rest on a decision of trust that is necessarily 
blind.76 While Marion tries to steer us away from faith understood as a 
decision, his material on the knowledge of love repeatedly forces us to 
acknowledge the role of the will to love.77 Christian theology affirms faith as a 
positive response to God’s self-revelation, but it also admits that faith cannot 
depend on any (other) ground than trust in God, which cannot be a matter of 
demonstration.78 Theology must remain cognisant of its non-foundational 
foundations.79 In this, faith is not opposed to reason, but is at the heart of 
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reason (it is reason’s reason), without being knowledge as such. The 
theological affirmation of the nexus between faith and reason is reiterated, 
albeit in a new key. 
 
The greatest potential overlap between the thought introduced here and 
Christian theology is in the areas of mystical and kenotic theologies. While it is 
evident that any kind of conversation is affected by the beliefs that frequently 
supplement faith, the thinking of faith itself as a moment of encounter with no-
thing is very helpful theologically, particularly as it is set within a framework 
that is cognisant of the limits of metaphysics. However, in privileging faith as 
unknowing (and revelation as hermeneutically conditioned), could we be 
accused of trying to inhibit the initiative or self-giving of revelation? While it is 
common for this argument to be invoked by theologians in the face of 
philosophers trying to determine conditions of possibility (but also 
impossibility) for revelation, thinking faith in this way does not preclude the 
possibility of faith as gift (or of revelation as being genuinely revelatory). It 
simply allows for humans to be human and, God help us, for God to be God. 
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11 Jacques Derrida, “Passions,” trans. David Wood, On the Name, ed. Thomas Dutoit 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995) 24, and 29-30: “… when there is no 
longer even any sense in making decisions about some secret behind the surface of 
a textual manifestation (and it is this situation which I would call text or trace), when it 
is the call [appel] of this secret, however, which points back to the other or to 
something else, when it is this itself which keeps our passion aroused, and holds us 
to the other, then the secret impassions us. Even if there is none, even if it does not 
exist, hidden behind anything whatever. Even if the secret is no secret, even if there 
has never been a secret, a single secret. Not one.” The reference to Caputo is from 
Prayers and Tears, 311. 
 
12 Derrida, “Epochē and Faith,” 39. 
 
13 Madden and Towsey, “Derrida, Faith and St Paul,” 407. 
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14 Derrida, “Epochē and Faith,” 38. 
 
15 Derrida, “Epochē and Faith,” 38. 
 
16 See the discussion by Hugh Rayment-Pickard: “It is reasonable to question 
whether there is any significance to an act of faith that is unfocused and non-specific. 
Recalling Husserl’s critique of empty consciousness, we may ask whether faith, like 
consciousness, should not be intentional, that is to say faith in something.” Rayment-
Pickard goes on to say that Derridean faith is undecidable rather than empty. 
However, he also notes: “ … Derrida’s faith in God is structurally restricted to some 
extent by the anti-metaphysical trajectory of deconstruction. …… The possible forms 
of the impossible God do not include the existence of God as a ‘real presence’, or an 
agent able to act in human affairs. The simple assertion of God’s reality is excluded 
by the ‘logic’ of his impossibility, indeed the argument for God’s impossibility is a way 
of protecting God from the restrictions of realist classification.” Impossible God: 
Derrida’s Theology (Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate, 2003) 147-48. 
 
17 Abraham, then, serves as a paradigm of faith. See Derrida, The Gift of Death, 
especially chapter 3. The summary of “deconstructive faith” provided by Ian Edwards 
emphasises the aspect of decision: “A deconstructive faith is sacrifice. First, it 
sacrifices the god that is known (It is a faith in God without God). Second, it sacrifices 
the object that one believes in. (It is a belief in the unbelievable [the impossible]). 
Third, it sacrifices faith itself. (It is a faith without faith.) And finally, it sacrifices 
definiteness. (It is being undecidably sure.) A deconstructive faith is a faith where 
decision, inscribed in indecision, is an element of what it means to be faithful.” 
“Derrida’s (Ir)religion: A Theology (of Différance),” Janus Head 6.1 (2003): 142-53, 
150. Finally, we note Derrida’s comment: “Each time, it was necessary to point to the 
possible (the condition of possibility) as to the impossible itself. And ‘if there is any’ 
doesn’t say ‘there is none,’ but rather, there isn’t anything that could make room for 
any proof, knowledge, constative or theoretical determination, judgment—especially 
not any determining judgment.” Jacques Derrida, On Touching: Jean-Luc Nancy, 
trans. Christine Irizarry (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005) 288.  
 
18 See, for example, Jean-Luc Nancy, “Atheism and Monotheism,” trans. Gabriel 
Malenfant and Bettina Bergo Dis-Enclosure: The Deconstruction of Christianity (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2008) 14-28, 26, 16-17. I will cite the essays from 
this book—which, aside from an appendix, belongs entirely to Nancy—separately, 
since they were not written together, have not been placed in chronological 
sequence, and have different translators. 
 
19 In his deconstruction of Christianity, Nancy asserts: “Christianity designates 
nothing other, essentially … than the demand to open in this world an alterity or 
unconditional alienation.” Nancy, “Opening,” Dis-Enclosure, 10. Identifying what he 
hopes to achieve in this project, Nancy elsewhere argues: “ … we must ask 
ourselves anew what it is that, without denying Christianity but without returning to it, 
could lead us toward a point—toward a resource—hidden beneath Christianity, 
beneath monotheism, and beneath the West, which we must henceforth bring to 
light….” Jean-Luc Nancy, “A Deconstruction of Monotheism,” trans. Gabriel 
Malenfant, Dis-Enclosure, 29-41, 34. On not returning to religion, see, for example, 
“Opening,” trans. Bettina Bergo, Dis-Enclosure, 1-13, 1. 
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20 The comment is made with reference to the thought of Maurice Blanchot. Jean-Luc 
Nancy, “The Name God in Blanchot,” trans. Michael B. Smith, Dis-Enclosure, 85-88, 
88. 
 
21 Nancy, “Atheism and Monotheism,” Dis-Enclosure, 15. 
 
22 Nancy, “Atheism and Monotheism,” Dis-Enclosure, 22-23. 
 
23 Nancy, “Atheism and Monotheism,” Dis-Enclosure, 25. 
 
24 “ … the e-levation takes place without knowledge and outside of sense. Neither 
firm knowledge (science), nor weak knowledge (belief). Neither belief in God, nor 
belief in man, nor belief in knowledge, nor even in art. Yet a firmness, yes, and a 
fidelity, even a devotion….” “What Kant’s expression holds open for us is none other 
than this: a critique of reason … makes unconditionally requisite, within reason itself, 
an opening and an e-levation of reason. It is not a question of ‘religion’ here, but 
rather of a ‘faith’ as a sign of the fidelity of reason to that which in and of itself 
exceeds reason’s phantasm of justifying itself as much as the world and man.” 
Nancy, “Atheism and Monotheism,” Dis-Enclosure, 28.  
 
25 Nancy uses both God and god, depending on the context. While I recognise the 
distinction is significant in terms of religious commitment, I will use the capital 
throughout my discussion. 
 
26 Nancy, “Atheism and Monotheism,” Dis-Enclosure, 26. 
 
27 “ ‘The one who does the will of my Father gives birth to me by participating in this 
act, and he is born with me. He who believes in effect that I am the only Son of God 
engenders me in some sense through his faith.’ ” Nancy, “Atheism and Monotheism,” 
Dis-Enclosure, 26, from Makarios, Le Monogénèse 2, trans. Richard Goulet (Paris: 
Vrin, 2003) 23. With regard to Eckhart, see, for example: “The Father gives birth to 
his Son in eternity, equal to himself…. Yet I say more: He has given birth to him in 
my soul. Not only is the soul with him, and he equal with it, but he is in it, and the 
Father gives his Son birth in the soul in the same way as he gives him birth in 
eternity, and not otherwise.” Sermon 6, which appears in Meister Eckhart: The 
Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense, trans. and intor Edmund 
Colledge and Bernard McGinn (New York: Paulist, 1981) 185-198, 187. See the 
discussion of the birth found in Bernard McGinn, The Mystical Thought of Meister 
Eckhart: The Man from whom God Hid Nothing (New York: Crossroad, 2001), 
chapter 4. See also Robert K. C. Forman, Meister Eckhart: The Mystic as 
Theologian—and Experiment in Methodology (Rockport, MA: Element, 1991), 
chapter 6. 
 
28 Nancy, “The Judeo-Christian (on Faith),” trans. Bettina Bergo, Dis-Enclosure, 42-
60, 56, and 58. See also Nancy, “The Deconstruction of Christianity,” trans. Michael 
b. Smith, Dis-Enclosure, 139-57, 152: “Faith consists in relating to God and to the 
name of God, to the extent that God and his love are not present, not shown.” 
 
29 And here he refers to the famous phrase from Meister Eckhart: “I pray to God that 
he make me free of God.” Nancy, “A Deconstruction of Monotheism,” Dis-Enclosure, 
36. 
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30 “This truth and this justice open most precisely where it is no longer a sacred 
presence that assures and guarantees, but the fact itself—the act and the work—of 
not being assured by any presence that might not be of the other, and other than 
itself … in a sense, or if one wishes, the sacred itself or the holy (to fuse them for an 
instant), but as not given, not posited, not presented in an order of divine presence—
on the contrary, ‘God’ ‘himself’ as unlike any god, as gift and as the gift of the faith 
that is given to the other and that believes in nothing.” Nancy, “The Judeo-Christian 
(on Faith),” Dis-Enclosure, 55. 
 
31 Perhaps Meister Eckhart, John of the Cross, the later Mechtild of Magdeburg, and 
so on. 
 
32 This phrase is actually from another essay, “An Experience at Heart, trans. Michael 
B. Smith, Dis-Enclosure, 75-84, 77. 
 
33 Nancy, “The Judeo-Christian (on Faith),” Dis-Enclosure, 52. 
 
34 Nancy, “The Judeo-Christian (on Faith),” Dis-Enclosure, 52. 
 
35 Nancy, “The Judeo-Christian (on Faith),” Dis-Enclosure, 53. 
 
36 Nancy, “The Judeo-Christian (on Faith),” Dis-Enclosure, 53-4.  
 
37 “ … this faith (‘persuasion,’ ‘wager of confidence,’ or ‘assurance of faithfulness’) 
must come from the other, this faith must come from outside, it is the outside opening 
in itself a passage toward the inside.” Nancy, “The Judeo-Christian (on Faith),” Dis-
Enclosure, 54. We cannot avoid asking, of course, just who this other might be. In the 
following paragraph, Nancy writes: “This act would be tied first to faith in the other—
which the other James, or Jacques [Derrida] calls ‘the relation to the other as the 
secret of testimonial experience’….” He goes on to explain that testimony might be of 
the other or of the other that I am to myself. The moment of faith being 
“homogenous” with a commandment is very suggestive of the receipt of the call 
described by both Chrétien and Marion. See, for example, Jean-Louis Chrétien, The 
Call and the Response, trans, Anne A. Davenport (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2004); Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of 
Givenness, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002) 289-
90; “ … the gifted has nothing passive about it since by its response (hermeneutic) to 
the call (intuitive), it, and it alone, allows what gives itself to become, partially but 
really, what shows itself,” “The Banality of Saturation,” trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky, 
Counter-Experiences: Reading Jean-Luc Marion, ed. Kevin Hart (South Bend, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2007) 383-418, 408-09. 
 
38 Nancy, “The Judeo-Christian (on Faith),” 54. Faith is the act of likeness with the 
gift, but this likeness as unlikeness (identity as incommensurability). 
 
39 Nancy, Dis-Enclosure, 179n; “The Judeo-Christian (on Faith),” Dis-Enclosure, 46. 
 
40 Nancy, “The Deconstruction of Christianity,” Dis-Enclosure, 152. 
 
41 Nancy, “The Deconstruction of Christianity,” Dis-Enclosure, 152-3. We should note 
here, of course, substantial differences from Marion, although I do not think there is 
an essential violence done to Marion’s thought here. 
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42 Nancy, “The Deconstruction of Christianity,” Dis-Enclosure, 153. 
 
43 Nancy compares the act of Christian faith with “faithfulness in love.” “ … the true 
correlate of Christian faith is not an object but a word. Faith consists in entrusting 
oneself to the word of God.” “ … our amorous faith is entirely Christian, since, as 
faithfulness, it entrusts itself to the word of the other, to the word that says ‘I love 
you,’ or doesn’t even say it.” Nancy, “The Deconstruction of Christianity,” Dis-
Enclosure, 153. 
 
44 Nancy, “The Deconstruction of Christianity,” Dis-Enclosure, 153-4. 
 
45 Nancy, “The Deconstruction of Christianity,” Dis-Enclosure, 154. 
 
46 Nancy, “ ‘Prayer Demythified’,” trans. Michael B. Smith, Dis-Enclosure, 129-138, 
133. 
 
47 Nancy, “ ‘Prayer Demythified’,” Dis-Enclosure, 138. 
 
48 Note the unannounced shift from “name” to “Name” within chapter 6 of Jean-Luc 
Marion, In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena, trans. Robyn Horner and 
Vincent Berraud (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002)  
 
49 Jean-Luc Marion, “They Recognized Him; and He Became Invisible to Them,” 
trans. Stephen E. Lewis, Modern Theology 18.2 (2002): 145-52; Conversations 
between Jean-Luc Marion and Richard Kearney in Debates in Continental 
Philosophy, 15-32. Although I do not refer to it further here, see also the homiletic 
piece, “Faith and Reason,” in Marion, Le visible et le révélé (Paris: CERF, 2005); The 
Visible and the Revealed, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner and others (New York: 
Fordham, 2008) 145-154. 
 
50 The essentials of Marion’s argument concerning revelation are as follows. 
Phenomenology has to do with the givenness of phenomena apart from any and all 
conditions. On the potential ambiguity here, see Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given, 61ff. 
Free from the principle of sufficient reason, phenomena do not have to appear 
according to the metaphysical horizons of object-ness, or even being, and they are 
not dependent on the constitutive capacities of the transcendental I. See, for 
example, the essay originally published in 1988, “Le possible et la revelation,” in 
Marion, Le visible et le révélé 13-34, 18ff.; The Visible and the Revealed, 1-17, 10ff. 
A fuller treatment is given in the phenomenological trilogy, particularly in Reduction 
and Givenness: Investigations of Husserl, Heidegger and Phenomenology, trans. 
Thomas A. Carlson (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998). Instead, 
phenomena appear as given (they “give themselves”), constituting their witness as a 
screen upon which they are projected. Marion frequently uses the reflexive form of 
the verb, that is, se donner, not to personalise what gives itself but to indicate that 
manifestation does not rest on the initiative of the witness. This becomes an issue 
where his critics argue that he always has in mind a divine Giver behind 
phenomenological gifts. While there are some phenomena that are poor in intuition, 
there are also phenomena that are saturated in intuition. It is not only the case that 
concepts overrun intuition (meaning exceeds what is actually given) but that intuition 
can also overrun the available concepts (what is given exceeds a single meaning, or 
even multiple meanings). See §§19-23 of Marion, Being Given. Further, as 
Heidegger showed, the invisible can give itself. See “Le possible et la revelation,” 20. 
See also the discussion that culminates in Being Given, 52. There is thus a 
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philosophical place for phenomena such as events, works of art, flesh, other persons, 
and revelation, none of which appear as objects to be conceptualised and yet all of 
which can still be given to consciousness. Now, Marion argues that a suitably 
modified phenomenology is “the method of manifestation of the invisible through its 
indicial phenomena,” and “thus also the method of theology.” Marion, “Le possible et 
la revelation,” Le visible et le révélé 22, 29ff.; The Visible and the Revealed, 7-8. 
While Marion maintains that phenomenology might provide a context for the 
possibility of phenomena of revelation, he insists that it cannot determine their 
actuality as Revelation. See Marion, Being Given, 367, 242, 297.  
 
51 How these phenomena are given is set out in Marion, Being Given and In Excess. 
This passage in the note above is a summary taken from Robyn Horner, “Excesso 
excessivo: Jean Luc-Marion e a superação da metafísica," trans. of “Exceeding 
Excess: Jean-Luc Marion and the Overcoming of Metaphysics,” Teologia e pós-
modernidade. Novas perspectivas em teologia e filosofia da religião, ed. Jaci 
Maraschin e Frederico Pieper Pires (São Paulo: Fonte Editorial, 2008). For the detail, 
see especially Robyn Horner, Rethinking God as Gift: Marion, Derrida, and the Limits 
of Phenomenology (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001); “Aporia or Excess? 
Two Strategies for Thinking R/revelation,” Derrida and Religion: Other Testaments, 
Ed. Kevin Hart and Yvonne Sherwood (London: Routledge, 2004) 325-336; and 
Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-Logical Introduction (Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate, 2005). 
 
52 Marion, “Banality,” Counter-Experiences, 401. Considering experience, Marion 
claims that it “does not always aim at an object nor is it always determined by a 
subject; it can also expose an ‘I’ that is non-transcendental (and non-empirical), but 
given over, to a non-constitutable because saturated phenomenon.” Marion, 
“Banality,” Counter-Experiences, 400. Marion earlier argues that the belief that 
experience cannot be thought without a subject in fact “rests on the univocity of the 
concept of subject” (384).  
 
53 Marion, “Banality,” Counter-Experiences, 400.  
 
54 Marion, “Banality,” Counter-Experiences, 402-404.  
 
55 Marion, “Banality,” Counter-Experiences, 404-405. See the fuller discussion in 
Robyn Horner, “The Insistent and Unbearable Excess: On the Experience of God in 
Marion’s Phenomenology.” ARC: the Journal of the Faculty of Religious Studies, 
McGill University 35 (2007): 105-30. 
 
56 Jean-Luc Marion, “Metaphysics and Phenomenology: A Relief for Theology,” trans. 
Thomas A. Carlson, Critical Inquiry (1994): 572-591. 589, trans. modified in line with 
Marion’s more recent preference for translating la donation (itself with reference to 
Gegebenheit) with “givenness.” The French original of this text was republished in 
2005 as part of Le visible et le révélé. 
 
57 Marion, In Excess, 155. 
 
58 Shane Mackinlay, Interpreting Excess: The Implicit Hermeneutics of Jean-Luc 
Marion’s Saturated Phenomena (PhD Diss. Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 2004) 
229-279; “Eyes Wide Shut: A Response to Jean-Luc Marion’s Account of the Journey 
to Emmaus,” Modern Theology 20.3 (2004); 447-56. 
 
59 Marion, “They Recognized Him,” 145. 
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60 Marion, “They Recognized Him,” 146. It is, of course, this very characteristic of 
deciding the undecidable that emerges in the work of Derrida. Ultimately, given the 
necessary hermeneutic dimension of phenomenology, it is hard to see how faith can 
be other than a decision. 
 
61 Marion, “They Recognized Him,” 150. The problem here in the context of the wider 
text is that faith appears to allow for an understanding of the revelation. This 
particular passage could be read alternately to mean that faith allows us to see the 
phenomenon as revelation, which is quite a different thing. 
 
62 Mackinlay, Interpreting Excess, 245. 
 
63 Mackinlay, Interpreting Excess, 246, 248. 
 
64 Mackinlay, Interpreting Excess, 249. Mackinlay argues that the conceptual 
component of faith is derivative, “made possible by a more fundamental level of faith 
that underlies it: faith as openness to receiving revelation, as acceptance of the 
claims made in revelation, as trust in what is given, and as preparedness to make a 
personal commitment in response. Faith in the sense of concepts and beliefs about 
something derives from this primary, existential sense of faith as personal trust in – 
and commitment to – a complex of meaning-filled relationships an significations in 
which a person situates himself or herself. Such an existential faith is an instance of 
what Heidegger describes as the fundamental or ontological sense of hermeneutics. 
Primarily, faith is an acceptance that opens a hermeneutic space of meaning, in 
which a phenomenon can first be recognised as revelatory; faith is an existential 
commitment that makes it possible for revelation to be made manifest. Revelation 
does not simply impose itself on us; rather, it must be actively received and 
recognised in the meaning-filled world of a recipient’s faith.” (250) 
 
65 Mackinlay, Interpreting Excess, 246.  
 
66 Jean-Luc Marion, “Evidence and Bedazzlement” Prolegomena to Charity, trans. 
Stephen E. Lewis (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002) 53-70, 62.  
 
67 Mackinlay, Interpreting Excess, 273ff. 
 
68 Mackinlay, Interpreting Excess, 275. 
 
69 The first part of this passage reads: “… in philosophy we have to ‘see’ to believe. 
What does that mean, to believe? For us, because we start from a philosophical point 
of view, we spontaneously think that to believe is to take for true, to assume 
something as if it were true, without any proof. This is our interpretation of belief. In 
that case, it is either belief or seeing. But is this the real meaning of belief? In fact, 
belief is also to commit yourself, and in that case, it is also, perhaps, a theoretical 
attitude. Because, by committing yourself to somebody else, you open a field of 
experience.” “The Hermeneutics of Revelation,” in Kearney, Debates in Continental 
Philosophy, 29.  
 
70 See the discussion in “The Weight of Love,” Counter-Experiences, 235-251, 237-
39, and Jean-Luc Marion, “Christian Philosophy and Charity,” Communio XVII 
(1992): 465-73, 469, 470. In the latter text, Marion notes: “ … new phenomena 
appear among the things of this world to an eye that is initiated in charity.” “ … only 
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those who love see the phenomena of love. …… The result is that for many 
observers, perhaps even most, these phenomena remain invisible, or else are 
reduced to an arbitrary interpretation, one of several possible interpretations….”  
 
71 “the revelation that Christ brings, that “God is love” (1 John 4:18) shows us not only 
what we can know [ce que nous pouvons connaître], but, moreover, how we can 
know [comment nous pouvons connaître]. Love constitutes the content as well as the 
advancement of faith….” Jean-Luc Marion, “Amour de Dieu, amour des hommes,” 
Résurrection 34 (1970): 89-96, 90. 
 
72 Marion, “Evidence and Bedazzlement,” Prolegomena to Charity, 64. 
 
73 Marion, “Evidence and Bedazzlement,” Prolegomena to Charity, 64. Marion is 
insistent here, in accord with the tradition, that it is the will’s own act, even as it is 
enabled by grace (64-65). In the description of self-abandonment that follows, Marion 
uses familiar tropes of the gift and of distance, which open onto difficulties that must 
not delay us here. See Rethinking God as Gift and Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-Logical 
Introduction. 
 
74 Marion argues: “the gifted has nothing passive about it since by its response 
(hermeneutic) to the call (intuitive), it, and it alone, allows what gives itself to become, 
partially but really, what shows itself.” “The Banality of Saturation,” Counter-
Experiences, 409. 
 
75 God Without Being, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1991) xix. 
 
76 The relationship between faith and love is obviously critical here, and no more so 
than in Marion’s understanding of what happens in the encounter with God.  
 
77 See the discussion in “The Weight of Love,” Counter-Experiences, 239, 240-42. 
 
78 This is highlighted at many points in the tradition, but see, for example, Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, available at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/ 
summa.html (accessed May 20 2008): “Two things are requisite for faith. First, that 
the things which are of faith should be proposed to man: this is necessary in order 
that man believe anything explicitly. The second thing requisite for faith is the assent 
of the believer to the things which are proposed to him. Accordingly, as regards the 
first of these, faith must needs be from God. Because those things which are of faith 
surpass human reason, hence they do not come to man’s knowledge, unless God 
reveal them.” ST 2a2ae. 6. 1. In faith the intellect is moved by the will (itself inspired 
by God) “to assent … to that which is believed.” ST 2a2ae.1.4: “Now the act of faith is 
to believe … which is an act of the intellect determinate to one object of the will’s 
command.” ST 2a2ae.4.1. Those things that are believed are not seen by the intellect 
(in the sense of demonstrated to it) but are known “by the light of faith which makes 
[the faithful] see that they ought to believe them….” ST 2a2ae.1.5. “But in the 
knowledge that is of faith, though there is high perfection on the part of the object so 
apprehended, there is great imperfection on the side of intellect, for intellect does not 
understand that to which it assents in believing. / 2. … in the knowledge of faith the 
will has a leading part: for the understanding assents by faith to the things proposed 
to it, because it wills to do so, without being necessarily drawn by the direct evidence 
of truth. / 3. He who believes, yields assent to things proposed to him by another, 
which himself he does not see: hence the knowledge of faith is more like hearing 
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than seeing.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 3.40, available at: 
http://www2.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/etext/gc.htm (accessed May 20 2008).  
 
79 This entry into the abyss that is faith is reminiscent in some ways of Heideggerian 
being-towards-death. 
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